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GIMME SHELTER: AMENDING FEMA’S ENABLING
LEGISLATION TO PERMIT CITIZEN SUITS FOR
FAILURES IN DISASTER RECOVERY EFFORTS
ZACHARY R.M. OUTZEN*

INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane,
made landfall at the mouth of the Pearl River (situated near the Louisiana
/Mississippi border).1 From there, the storm brought maximum sustained
wind speeds of 110 knots throughout Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.2
There was no precise way to measure how much flooding Katrina brought
to these areas throughout its lifespan, as there were not enough buildings left behind to provide the high-water marks used at that time to calculate the level of flooding.3 Hurricane Katrina dissipated rather quickly,
gradually being absorbed into a weather front over the Eastern Great
Lakes only two days after making landfall.4 It had only taken two days
for Katrina to become one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes to
ever strike the United States.5
One contributing factor to Katrina’s staggering financial impact
was the hundreds and thousands of households (substantially comprised
of lower-income and Black families) left homeless in the hurricane’s
wake.6 Congress quickly approved $62.3 billion in funding to be primarily
*
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1
RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 23–30 AUGUST 2005, 1, 3 (2011), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122
005_Katrina.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PLE-N566].
2
Id. at 1, 3.
3
Id. at 8–9.
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 1.
6
John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA’s Failure
to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disaster, 68 LA. L.R. 443, 443 n.3 (2008).
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administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) for
the purposes of providing disaster relief, much of which was marked for
housing relief assistance to be provided as expressed by the Stafford Act.7
However, after three months had passed, thousands of the displaced families remained in limbo without receiving any housing assistance at all.8
Some had their claims for assistance outright denied by FEMA on the
basis of “‘mechanical or arbitrary presumption[s] of fraud’ that arguably
had no factual basis.”9
Worse still, FEMA’s failure to provide necessary guidance on housing assistance provided by external agencies (such as the Treasury Department) meant that some displaced families received a check with no
instructions, spent it on other necessities, and were later informed that
they were now debtors to the federal government for spending housing
assistance elsewhere.10 A particularly high degree of dysfunction in FEMA’s
response to Hurricane Katrina is evidenced by this attempt to deliver
financial assistance to disaster victims—over 1,000,000 of whom lived in
poverty before Hurricane Katrina destroyed their homes—which instead
left them further in debt.11
FEMA’s Kafkaesque housing assistance response to Hurricane
Katrina has been thoroughly dissected by stakeholders to provide learning
points for the Agency to better prepare for future catastrophes.12 A Government Accountability Office report issued in 2007 found that “FEMA had
initiated various catastrophic planning efforts, but they were incomplete
at the time of Hurricane[] Katrina . . . .”13 The sluggish grind of FEMA’s
bureaucracy created challenges not only through hindering the swift delivery of housing relief assistance, but also by fostering an atmosphere
of distrust among the public, leading those displaced households lucky

7

Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
9
Id. at 446.
10
Id.
11
Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 455.
12
Hari Sreenivasan, How Has FEMA Changed in the Ten Years Since Hurricane Katrina?,
PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 29, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/fema
-changed-ten-years-since-hurricane-katrina#:~:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20Hur
ricane,agency%20has%20undergone%20many%20reforms [https://perma.cc/5B24-JV7F]
(“In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency—
FEMA—was widely blamed for a lack of preparedness and an inadequate response.”).
13
Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 446 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-07-88, DISASTER ASSISTANCE: BETTER PLANNING NEEDED FOR HOUSING VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS 6 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0788.pdf [https://perma
.cc/36W9-GDV5]).
8
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enough to receive housing assistance to struggle with “FEMA-shy landlords
who refused to take the vouchers because of FEMA’s ‘broken promises,
unreasonable deadlines[,] and mind-numbing bureaucracy.’”14 Denise
Bottcher, press secretary to then–Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco,
summed FEMA’s response up best when she said, “[w]e wanted helicopters,
food[,] and water. [FEMA] wanted to negotiate an organizational chart.”15
Following the botched relief efforts and widespread public scrutiny,
FEMA has undergone a series of reforms in an effort to improve future
disaster relief efforts.16 These reforms, while well-intended and appreciated, have yet to prove sufficient to improve FEMA’s capacity to respond
to large-scale natural disasters. After Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto
Rico in 2017, 332,000 Puerto Ricans had their claims for housing relief
assistance denied due to “agency regulations and policies that require recipients of assistance to prove they own and occupy the damaged dwellings.”17 A 2018 Government Accountability Office report analyzing FEMA’s
response to the 2017 hurricane and wildfire seasons stated that “state
officials . . . noted challenges in coordinating with FEMA that led to delays in providing assistance to survivors.”18 According to FEMA’s own
Hurricane Maria post-response analysis, the agency “lost track of much of
the aid it delivered and who needed it,” causing a humanitarian crisis that
the Mayor of San Juan described as “something close to a genocide.”19
Public distrust in FEMA stemming from their bureaucratic processes has
not abated, either; in August 2020, members of the California congressional
delegation were compelled to request that the Department of Homeland
Security Inspector General investigate reports that disaster relief aid had
been improperly denied to California wildfire victims on the basis of the
state’s ideological leanings.20
14

Id. at 448.
FEMA Faces Intense Scrutiny, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 9, 2005, 12:02 PM) [hereinafter
FEMA Faces Scrutiny], https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july
-dec05-fema_09-09 [https://perma.cc/79KF-YAHH].
16
Sreenivasan, supra note 12.
17
Andres Viglucci, They Lost Homes in Hurricane Maria, But Didn’t Have Deeds. FEMA
Rejected Their Claims, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.miamiherald
.com/news/nation-world/national/article217935625.html [https://perma.cc/7EUK-D6WU].
18
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-472, 2017 HURRICANES AND WILDFIRES:
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEDERAL RESPONSE AND KEY RECOVERY CHALLENGES (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-472 [https://perma.cc/E6UT-4W6P].
19
Frances Robles, FEMA Was Sorely Unprepared for Hurricane Maria, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/us/fema-puerto-rico-maria
.html [https://perma.cc/EKT2-M7FH].
20
Letter from Members of Cal. Delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives, to Hon.
Joseph Chaffin, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 21, 2020), https://lieu
15

878

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:875

In a microcosm, FEMA’s failures to timely deliver housing relief
assistance leaves hundreds of thousands of disaster victims hungry, homeless, stressed, and anxious.21 On a broader level, FEMA’s failures leave
deep socioeconomic scars that become another chapter in a long story of
socioeconomic inequality in America. Federal data shows that individual
white Americans often receive more money in FEMA disaster aid than
their Black counterparts, even when the financial amount of damage is the
same.22 In predominantly Black neighborhoods, eleven percent of disaster victims requesting housing relief assistance had their applications
denied by FEMA with no reason given, compared to just four percent of
white disaster victims receiving such denials to their applications.23 For
white Americans living in counties struck by natural disaster, their personal wealth actually grew by an average of five times more than the
personal wealth of white Americans in non-disaster-struck counties.24 In
contrast, Black residents in counties struck by natural disaster had their
personal wealth decrease.25 These data points are only a handful in a long
trend line that led FEMA’s own National Advisory Council to conclude
that FEMA is not in compliance with its requirement under the Stafford
Act to “[process applications and distribute financial relief and assistance]
in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the
grounds of race [or economic status, inter alia] . . . .”26
Beyond the immediate urgency of meeting a disaster victim’s needs
for life, there is a moral imperative, then, to treat reforming FEMA’s
disaster relief procedures as a social justice issue. This Note argues that
democratizing the disaster relief process through enabling citizen suits
against FEMA to timely deliver housing relief assistance is one potential
solution to the immense problem at hand. This Note provides an overview of FEMA’s obligations to survivors of natural disasters under both
federal law and evolving interpretations of binding international law. This
Note asserts that FEMA’s repeated failure to deliver necessary disaster
.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/2020-08-21%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20OIG%20re%
20California%20wildfire%20assistance%20investigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3UT-BRME].
21
Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 447.
22
Christopher Flavelle, Why Does Disaster Aid Often Favor White People?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/climate/FEMA-race-climate.html
[https://perma.cc/LZX6-KWFG].
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
NAT’L ADVISORY COUNCIL, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NOV. 2020 REPORT TO THE
FEMA ADM’R 12 (2020).
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relief aid to these survivors constitutes violations of these obligations.
This Note will then assert that the issue underlying these failures (i.e.,
flawed administrative and bureaucratic processes) is analogous to similar
failures by environmental agencies. This Note will then propose that a
citizen suit provision, similar to those under federal environmental law that
have compelled agency action in the past, should be adopted to FEMA’s
enabling legislation to remedy failures to meet their obligations. Finally,
this Note will examine the application of citizen suits since their introduction to understand how such a provision may operate under FEMA’s
enabling legislation, and to identify structural challenges faced by citizen
suits that can be learned from to best ensure successful implementation
moving forward.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FEMA’S OBLIGATIONS

A.

Obligations Under the Stafford Act and Other Federal Law

Federal law tasks the FEMA Administrator with “providing the
Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters . . .
[and] aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters.”27
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief & Emergency Assistance Act (“the
Stafford Act”) that created FEMA states that in order for FEMA-led major
disaster assistance programs—such as housing assistance—to receive
federal authorization, Governors of states affected by the disaster must
first initiate an “appropriate” state level response.28 After doing so, the
Governor may then request a Presidential declaration that the severity
and magnitude of the disaster exceeds the state government’s capacity
to respond, at which point the President may direct the FEMA Administrator to implement the major disaster assistance programs under Title
IV of the Act.29
Title IV continues to prescribe which major disaster assistance programs the President may direct the Administrator to implement, including the individual and household assistance relief provisions of Section
408.30 Section 408 specifically authorizes the provision of “financial or
27

6 U.S.C. § 314 (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2021).
29
Id.
30
Other sections of the Stafford Act outline various other forms of disaster relief that the
President may implement. For example, Section 403 authorizes the provision of “Essential
Assistance,” such as “Medicine, Food, and Other Consumables.” See 42 U.S.C. § 5170(b).
28
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other assistance” to individual families and households, such as housing
assistance.31 To be eligible for housing assistance under Section 408, a
household must have either been displaced by the disaster from their primary residence or had it rendered uninhabitable.32
The first form of authorized housing assistance under Section 408
is direct financial assistance for rental of temporary housing units, as
determined by the fair market rent for the accommodation provided plus
ancillary costs.33 FEMA typically provides such assistance through the
issuance of an initial check covering three months’ worth of rent, with
further assistance provided upon proof of need by eligible applicants.34
Direct assistance through the provision of actual temporary housing units
is also authorized under this section.35 This assistance enables displaced
disaster victims in areas without available rental units to reside in mobile
homes or trailers.36 This Section also authorizes financial assistance to
address other expenses for survivors, including medical, dental, child
care, and funeral expenses.37
For the purposes of this Note, it is key to note that this section of the
Stafford Act does not in and of itself create a binding obligation upon the
FEMA Administrator. Rather, it creates the structures through which the
President, through the Administrator, provides the forms of aid described
therein.38 It is the failure to adequately comply with these specific instructions which gives rise to the problems with which this Note is concerned.
B.

Obligations Under International Law

The role of international law in creating obligations upon states
who ratify a particular treaty is uneven relative to the obligations under
ratifying states’ own laws. Because there is no international judiciary that
can compel a state to comply with a judicial interpretation of a treaty,
these obligations are normative, whereas domestic laws come with their
own mechanisms to facilitate their enforcement. With that being said, for

However, this Note will focus on the Section 408 disaster relief benefits targeted towards
federal assistance for individuals and households.
31
42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1).
32
Id. § 5174(a)(1).
33
Id. § 5174(c).
34
Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 451.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e).
38
Additional forms of financial assistance include relocation, legal, and mental health
counseling assistance under sections 414 through 416. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5181–83.
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the purposes of this Note, an analysis of international human rights law is
illustrative to identify ways in which FEMA’s disaster relief responses deviate from internationally recognized principles, and to provide guidance
for how to bring these shortcomings in line with international obligations.
Throughout the twenty-first century, United Nations member states
have reached a general consensus regarding the implications of climate
change on human rights.39 This consensus includes the mutual understanding of the role climate change plays in exacerbating the severity of
natural disasters.40 There is a less developed understanding of how to
translate the existing body of international human rights law into a recognizable set of obligations, but generally accepted principles have emerged
as a point of reference for member states.41
The two relevant treaties which the United States has signed and
ratified into force are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights42 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).43 The
ICCPR contains positive obligations to protect the “rights to life, health,
and an adequate standard of living . . . .”44 This has been interpreted by
a number of international courts and United Nations special rapporteurs
to create “a general duty to ‘adopt legal and institutional frameworks that
protect against, and respond to, environmental harm that may or does
interfere with the enjoyment of human rights.”45 The European Court of
Human Rights has incorporated the scientific consensus regarding the
effects of climate change on natural disasters to hold that “states must
also take reasonable measures to protect citizens against the reasonably
foreseeable effects of natural disasters.”46 While such a ruling does not
create an obligation upon the United States, it speaks to evolving interpretations among the international community regarding human rights
and natural disasters.
United Nations Special Rapporteurs have elaborated upon what
measures member states should take to protect human rights in the wake
of natural disaster. Notably, these measures include efforts to protect
39

U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2015).
Id. at 19 (“The adverse impacts of climate change [including natural disasters] clearly
qualify as ‘environmental harms.’”).
41
Id. at 13.
42
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://indicators.ohchr
.org/ [https://perma.cc/MB9Z-LQU3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
43
Id.
44
U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 39, at 19.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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those displaced by natural disasters.47 These measures include efforts to
“[ensure] adequate resettlement opportunities for those who are temporarily displaced by climate change–related disasters, and ensuring that
‘temporary relocation must last only as long as absolutely necessary and
all displaced persons should have the right to return to their homes without discrimination.’”48 Rapporteurs have further urged member states to
“[adhere] to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which describe how human rights considerations should be incorporated into
government actions to prevent and manage internal displacement.”49
To reiterate, it is difficult to definitively say how the framework
of international human rights obligations bears directly on FEMA’s failures to deliver necessary relief to disaster survivors. Further, the United
States is not a ratifying party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,50 which more explicitly speaks to the
human rights of families displaced by natural disaster. It is fair to say
that there is a growing international recognition that natural disasters
directly implicate human rights issues, and that United Nations member
states that have agreed to the international human rights framework
have a positive obligation to address such issues. Given the nature of international law, this in and of itself does not create a mandate for FEMA.
However, it supports the assertion that there is a strong normative
obligation for states that are concerned with human rights to satisfy the
needs of disaster survivors. This normative obligation, in conjunction
with the binding mandates of American federal law, create the need to
ensure that FEMA competently and conscientiously addresses the needs
of disaster survivors.
II.

EXAMINING CITIZEN SUITS

A.

History & Relevance of the Citizen Suit Provision

The first Congressional recognition of the need for a mechanism
to compel action (or remedy inaction) by federal agencies failing to fulfill
47

Id. at 22.
Id. (citing Raquel Rolnik (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of
Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/62/25
(Aug. 6, 2009)).
49
Id. (citing Chaloka Beyani (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/43 (Dec. 20, 2010)).
50
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, supra note 42.
48
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their mandate arose with the Clean Air Act of 1970, which enabled citizens to act as “‘private attorneys general.’”51 The Congressional legislative
history of the Clean Air Act reflects Congressional intent to “enlist citizens as ‘useful instrument[s] for detecting violations and bringing them
to the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike.’”52 The
citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act reads:
a.

[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf . . .
(2)
against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator . . .53

This basic model of a citizen suit provision has since been replicated
throughout the majority of federal environmental laws, including the Clean
Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, inter alia.54
One notable early success of the citizen suit provision in the
context of environmental law came when the Natural Resources Defense
Council successfully compelled the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) Administrator Russell Train to list lead as a “criteria air pollutant” under Section 108 of the Clean Air Act, which reads:
(a)(1) For the purposes of establishing national primary
and secondary air quality standards, the Administrator shall within 30 days [of enactment of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970] . . . publish, and
shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list
which includes each air pollutant—
(A)
emissions of which, in his judgment, cause
or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare;

51

Katherine Rouse, Note, Holding the EPA Accountable: Judicial Construction of Environmental Citizen Suit Provisions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2018).
52
Id.
53
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2).
54
Rouse, supra note 51, at 1277.
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the presence of which in the ambient air
results from numerous or diverse mobile or
stationary sources; and
for which air quality criteria had not been
issued before [the date of enactment of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970] . . . but for
which he plans to issue air quality criteria
under this section.55

The argument advanced by the plaintiffs was that the plain text of Section 108(a)(1)’s usage of “shall” indicated that the duty to list criteria air
pollutants satisfying the statutory requirements is nondiscretionary.56
While the EPA conceded that lead satisfied the requirements of Section
108(a)(1)(A) and (B), they argued that the statutory language of (C)
indicated that the Administrator retains discretion over the decision to
list a pollutant.57 The Second Circuit held that the plain text of the statute
and its legislative history clearly supported the plaintiff’s arguments and
reaffirmed the district court’s holding of the same.58
While this Note does not deal with air pollution, Train is important to understand the development of the citizen suit’s role in enforcing
nondiscretionary duties in the face of federal inaction. The relevant principle demonstrated in Train—that citizen suits are an appropriate tool
for rectifying federal inaction—is not necessarily a principle that demonstrates whether judicial enforcement is sufficient to remedy the problem
that necessitates federal action in the first place. While solving the public
health crisis caused by lead pollution in the 1970s was not a problem that
lay within the ambit of the judiciary, the decision in Train showed that
citizen suits are at least one arrow in Congress’s quiver to solving largescale issues. Following the EPA’s listing of lead as a criteria air pollutant
and the subsequent promulgation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for lead, lead emissions, atmospheric lead concentration, and “‘average blood levels of lead in Americans’” decreased, with
“‘the ambient air quality standard for lead that emanated from the
55

42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)–(C).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324–25 (2d Cir. 1976).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 328. It should be further noted that later Supreme Court decisions have held that
the difference between “may” and “shall” in a statute’s text is superficial if a nondiscretionary duty is still imposed. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (“If [the statute]
functions not as a grant of discretion . . . but both as an authorization and a command . . .
then Congress’ use of the word ‘may,’ rather than ‘shall,’ has no significance.”).
56
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[NRDC v. Train] litigation [undoubtedly playing] a role in those reductions . . . .’”59
B.

Judicial Limitations on Citizen Suit Litigation

As environmental litigation brought by private attorneys general
proliferated, so too did a limiting principle. The emergence of a “datecertain deadline rule” began developing among several circuits and district
courts that have generally held that courts will not compel EPA performance of a nondiscretionary duty “unless Congress both (1) specifies the
duty, and (2) provides a date-certain or readily ascertainable deadline.”60
The date-certain rule derives from the D.C. Circuit’s decision of
Sierra Club v. Thomas in 1987.61 The plaintiff in this case brought a
citizen suit against the EPA to compel their completion of a proposed rule
that would include strip mines as a pollutant source regulated by the
Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program.62
The plaintiff argued that under the overarching PSD program, the EPA
had a nondiscretionary duty of timeliness that it had failed to meet.63
However, the D.C. Circuit rejected this, holding that the absence of a
specific deadline left this duty discretionary.64 In doing so, the court
emphasized that, “[a]lthough a date-certain deadline . . . may or may not
be discretionary, it is highly improbable that a deadline will ever be nondiscretionary . . . if it exists only by reason of an inference drawn from
the overall statutory framework.”65
While some courts fully embraced the date-certain deadline test,66
others still—including the D.C. Circuit67—have hesitated to rely on it or
outright rejected it. In one such case in 1996, the Eastern District of
59

Rouse, supra note 51, at 1280–81 n.50.
James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 28 (2003).
61
Rouse, supra note 51, at 1286.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1287.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 888 (1st Cir. 1989); Zen-Noh Grain Corp. v.
Jackson, 943 F. Supp. 2d 657, 662 (E.D. La. 2013); Defs. of Wildlife v. Browner, 888 F.
Supp. 1005, 1008–09 (D. Ariz. 1995) (all strictly applying the date-certain deadline to find
no discretionary duty under various EPA statutes).
67
Rouse, supra note 51, at 1288 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).
60
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Pennsylvania declined to apply the rule to a Clean Water Act citizen suit
brought against the EPA for failing to promulgate a water quality standard for the state, pursuant to its obligations to do so when a state issues
water quality standards noncompliant with the Clean Water Act.68 While
the EPA argued that the relevant statutory text (reading “The Administrator shall promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations”) lacked
a date-certain deadline, the court held that “shall” is sufficient to impose
a nondiscretionary duty in the absence of a date-certain deadline.69 In
doing so, the court explicitly recognized that some jurisdictions applied the
date-certain deadline, but rejected it in the case at hand on the grounds
that: (1) the rule was originally created to interpret a “bifurcated jurisdictional scheme” present in the Clean Air Act, but not the Clean Water
Act; (2) application of the date-certain deadline directly contravenes the
intent and purpose of the Clean Water Act; and (3) the Third Circuit (in
which the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sits) had not yet adopted the
date-certain deadline.70
For the purposes of extrapolating conclusions from judicial limitations on citizen suit provisions, trends regarding application of the datecertain deadline provide little more than the understanding that it is a
potential pitfall facing proliferation of citizen suit provisions outside of
the environmental law context. This is particularly true when considering that the Supreme Court is silent on the issue of the date-certain
deadline. As of 2020, there is a dearth of empirical studies to examine
any correlation between the adoption by some courts of the date-certain
deadline and a decline in citizen suits seeking to compel performance of
a nondiscretionary duty.71 One study (although more than a decade old)
found that between 1995 and 2002, such citizen suits declined in number
significantly.72 While that falls after the decision in Thomas, there is little
to support an inference of causation between these facts. For now, this
Note will treat the date-certain deadline as an existing, if murky, roadblock that should be addressed in any addition of a citizen suit provision
to the Stafford Act.
68

Rouse, supra note 51, at 1294 (citing Raymond Proffitt Found. v. EPA, 930 F. Supp.
1088, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
69
Id. at 1296.
70
Id. at 1297–98.
71
David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Reevaluating Environmental Citizen Suits
in Theory & Practice, 91 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 386, 393 (2020).
72
May, supra note 60, at 21 (“[C]itizens sent 25% fewer notices to regulated parties in
2002 than they did in 1995.”).
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Practical Limitations Upon the Citizen Suit Provision

Generally speaking, the effectiveness of any citizen suit provision
will vary depending on the statutory framework to which it belongs. Each
legislative scheme will prescribe differing numbers of nondiscretionary
duties upon the agency responsible for administering it. Because citizen
suit provisions afford plaintiffs the ability to sue either an agency administrator for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty or any person who
violates the provisions of the statutory framework to which it belongs,73
the ability to obtain meaningful remedy may depend upon whether, for
instance, a large corporate entity or a municipal public water system is
the defendant.74
It is fair to state that there is a broad array of practical barriers
to success in a citizen suit that a private citizen with limited funds and
expertise faces when suing a governmental or corporate entity who has
decidedly less of such limitations. A useful case study to understanding
this dynamic is that of the Safe Drinking Water Act’s (“SDWA”) citizen
suit provision.
The SDWA seeks to ensure that water quality across the nation
is sufficient to safeguard public health, doing so through two avenues of
regulation: (1) imposing maximum levels for regulated contaminants on
public water systems; and (2) preventing contamination of sources of
drinking water.75 Regulated contaminants are listed by the EPA Administrator, who considers the potential for adverse health effects towards the
average citizen, higher-risk subgroups (e.g., infants, pregnant women,
etc.), and balances this with a cost-benefit analysis.76 Similar to the Clean
Air Act’s NAAQS criteria air pollutant listing requirements, the Administrator has a nondiscretionary duty to regulate a contaminant if they
determine that:
(i) the contaminant may have an adverse effect on the
health of persons; (ii) the contaminant is known to occur
or there is a substantial likelihood that the contaminant
73

Christine L. Rideout, Note, Where Are All the Citizen Suits?: The Failure of Safe
Drinking Water Enforcement in the United States, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 655,
656 (2011).
74
Id. at 692 (“Congress [likely did not authorize civil penalties on defendants in SDWA
citizen suits because they] did not want to bankrupt [Public Water Systems]—which
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75
Id. at 663.
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will occur in public water systems with a frequency and at
levels [sufficient to endanger] public health; and (iii) in the
sole judgment of the Administrator, regulation of such
contaminant [can meaningfully achieve] health risk reduction . . . .77
Despite being armed with what appears to be—on paper at least—
sufficient statutory weight to fulfill the goals of the SDWA, the United
States faces recurrent public health issues with access to safe drinking
water. Since 2015, the City of Newark, New Jersey, has dealt with unsafe
levels of lead (a pollutant regulated by the SDWA) in their drinking water
supply.78 While the City of Flint, Michigan, no longer has unsafe levels
of lead present in their drinking water,79 the City’s well-publicized water
crisis was linked to an outbreak of Legionnaire’s Disease that led to
twelve deaths, for which five state and local officials faced involuntary
manslaughter charges.80
There are a myriad number of factors to look to for an explanation
of the failure of the SDWA to protect the public health of these cities. In
some instances, neither state officials nor the EPA actually enforce the
provisions of the SDWA.81 This has been attributed to “political pressure,

77
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scientific uncertainty[,] and bureaucratic inertia.”82 A 2011 Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) report highlighted “troubling issues with
a lack of transparency and credibility in the determination of contaminants,” among other programmatic failures, as contributing to the SDWA’s
shortcomings in regulation of various contaminants.83
While there is considerably less room for external influence in the
disaster declaration process than there is in the SDWA’s rule-making
process (which turns on discrete, complex information), a key challenge
to a potential Stafford Act citizen suit provision is that the level of assistance to be distributed is determined by Congress.84 Congress is responsible for funding the Disaster Relief Fund from which FEMA provides
disaster relief, and “has been generally willing to provide resources for
major disasters on an as-needed basis.”85 However, the Congressional
Research Services notes that “discussions of deficit and debt continue in
Congress, and may increase in frequency and volume as the Budget Control Act nears expiration in [2021].”86 At the time of this writing, the
COVID-19 pandemic provides a real-time example of austerity politics
shaping the amount of discretionary spending directed towards disaster
relief.87 There is, unfortunately, no judicial provision which can cure federal inaction predicated upon Congress declining to extend the power of
the purse towards disaster relief.
The last key practical limitation a potential Stafford Act citizen
suit provision should address comes from within the Act itself. Section 305
of the Act, Nonliability of the Federal Government, provides that “[FEMA]
shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance
of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
82
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the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government
in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.”88 This is particularly problematic, because under the current Stafford Act, FEMA’s procedure and
final determination of a disaster relief applicant’s eligibility are both considered discretionary functions,89 precluding judicial review via citizen
suit for failure to timely deliver disaster relief as a result of the process
and its outcome.
With that being said, the proposed citizen suit amendment to the
Stafford Act can and should legislate away most of the above limitations.
By: (a) adding a citizen suit provision modeled on the Clean Air Act’s provision; (b) minimizing FEMA’s discretion through amending all nonmandatory language to mandatory language; and (c) minimizing FEMA’s
discretion in establishing verification procedures for housing assistance
eligibility, Congress could create a meaningful judicial remedy for disaster
victims and empower them to compel FEMA’s delivery of housing assistance to which they are entitled.
D.

The Proposed Amendment to the Stafford Act

1.

Amending the Stafford Act to Include a Citizen Suit Provision

The first component to the proposed amendment should be a
straightforward addition of a citizen suit provision that models the language of the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision.90 In the context of the
Stafford Act, the language would authorize civil actions against the FEMA
administrator for failure to perform any nondiscretionary duty under the
Stafford Act. In conjunction with the rest of the proposed amendments,
this would render timely delivery of housing assistance a nondiscretionary function to be compelled under judicial review.
It is key to note that modeling the proposed Stafford Act citizen suit
provision upon the Clean Air Act would require incorporation of a datecertain deadline, as the permitting programs of the Clean Air Act do.91
While this Note does not propose a specific time limit, a good starting point
would be to require a thirty-day deadline by which FEMA must deliver
88
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Section 408 disaster relief benefits upon receipt of an eligible disaster victim’s application for such benefits. By providing a date-certain deadline
(e.g., thirty days upon receipt of application) in conjunction with nonmandatory language, any court that does apply strict date-certain deadline
requirements in finding nondiscretionary functions would have no grounds
upon which to find the amended Section 408 duties to be discretionary.92
Finally, it is worth noting that the creation of a citizen suit provision would fulfill international normative obligations to create judicial
remedies for human rights violations caused by environmental harms.93
By empowering courts to compel FEMA’s provision of individual and
household assistance to eligible applicants, the proposed amendment
would be the exact type of “legal and institutional framework that protects against . . . environmental harm . . . [to] human rights” that the
international community calls for.94
2.

Amending the Stafford Act to Make Discretionary Functions
Under Section 408 Nondiscretionary Duties

While adding a citizen suit provision to the Stafford Act is a
straightforward enough first step, it alone would be insufficient to provide a remedy for the problem at hand. The failure to deliver disaster
relief benefits in a timely fashion can generally be said to stem from two
organizational dysfunctions within FEMA: (1) bureaucratic and organizational delay;95 and (2) arbitrary assumptions of fraud in disaster relief
assistance applications.96
Under the current legal framework, jurisprudence in administrative
law offers no remedy for failure to deliver disaster relief due to bureaucratic delay. In the words of Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens,
“as [the Supreme Court has] repeated time and time again, an agency has
broad discretion to choose how best to martial its limited resources and
personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.”97 In cases involving
arbitrary assumptions of fraud, the current legal framework is downright
unforgiving towards judicial review. As Anne Sikes Hornsby writes:
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Case law makes clear that there is no question that decisions to grant or deny disaster aid pursuant to FEMA
policy are discretionary. FEMA’s statutes give it the authority to establish eligibility standards and to make determinations of who meets its established criteria. The Stafford
Act provisions pertaining to individual and household aid
are replete with the language of discretion. The lacing of
aid provisions with permissive language has led courts to
frequently characterize awards of disaster financial assistance from FEMA as “gratuitous.” . . . The provision or withholding of virtually every FEMA benefit has been deemed
a discretionary act, and immune from suit.98
So, it suffices to say that absent limitations on agency discretion, simply
adding a citizen suit provision to the Stafford Act will not be enough to
permit judicial review of FEMA’s distribution of disaster relief.
3.

Amending the Stafford Act to Reduce Discretion in FEMA’s
Verification of Applicant Eligibility for Section 408 Benefits

Virtually every provision under Section 408 of the Stafford Act is
currently framed in language granting discretionary authority to the
President, through their authorized agent (i.e., the FEMA Administrator),
to provide disaster relief if they so choose, and to do so in any fashion
that they see fit.99 Because “decisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited governmental resources are the type of administrative
judgment that the discretionary function was designed to immunize from
suit,”100 the most viable solution to the Stafford Act’s expansive discretionary language is Congressional action to render certain provisions
nondiscretionary.
International law provides a clear framework of normative obligations to guide revision of the statutory text. Congress can start by looking
to which forms of disaster relief most directly parallel the ICCPR’s positive
obligations to protect the “rights to life, health, and an adequate standard of living.”101 Applying that obligation towards Section 408 would support the simple step of amending the language therein to replace every
98
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usage of “may” with “shall.” Pursuant to the Second Circuit’s decision in
Train,102 this would be the first necessary step towards creating nondiscretionary functions under Section 408.
While amending Section 408 to include mandatory language
would likely be sufficient to render delivery of disaster relief benefits
nondiscretionary, further amendments are required to bring FEMA’s disaster relief response in line with normative obligations to ensure “adequate
resettlement opportunities for those who are temporarily displaced by climate change–related disasters, . . . that ‘temporary relocation must last
only as long as absolutely necessary[,] and all displaced persons should
have the right to return to their homes without discrimination.’”103
FEMA’s current process for determining eligibility for Section 408
assistance is predicated on a certain amount of bureaucratic delay and
places undue burden on disaster victims. As an example, uninsured homeowners applying for Section 408 assistance are required to prove losses
caused by the disaster.104 This is done by scheduling an appointment
with a FEMA inspector at the damaged property, who is responsible for
“determin[ing whether] the damage was caused by the disaster and
affects the functionality of the home.”105 Part of the inspection includes
verifying a significant amount of documentation to which the applicant
is unlikely to have access.106 Within roughly ten days, FEMA provides the
applicant with a determination of their eligibility for aid, and if granted,
how much aid they will receive.107 If the applicant is determined to be
ineligible, they receive a letter stating this determination and have sixty
days to respond via written letter.108 Even if an applicant does everything
correctly, there is little guarantee that they will receive assistance in a
timely fashion. As noted by Shannon Collins Schroeder:
[I]n the midst of a catastrophe, when the system is already
overworked, it can take weeks before an applicant knows
if her application has been approved. As of December 2017,
102
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over three months after Hurricane Harvey made landfall,
“about half of those who applied for disaster assistance
from FEMA . . . say their application is still pending or has
been denied, and many of those who were denied say they
were not told the reason for the denial and were not given
information on how to resubmit their application.” . . .
Additionally, even after aid has been granted and disbursed,
some recipients have been asked to repay that aid due to
mistakes made by FEMA agents.109
As the Massachusetts court noted, agencies are acting within their discretion when determining how to best marshal their limited resources,
even when that determination does not reflect efficiency.110
The proposed amendment to the Stafford Act that would allow for
judicial review of these processes while balancing FEMA’s discretion with
improvement of Section 408 assistance distribution would shift the burden
of proving eligibility away from the applicant and create a presumption
of eligibility that can be retroactively verified.111
Creating a presumption of eligibility would require amending
Section 408(I), which grants FEMA the authority to develop a system to,
inter alia, verify that only eligible applicants receive financial assistance
and to minimize the risk of duplicative or fraudulent payments.112 While
there is a legitimate governmental interest in preventing fraud, the
COVID-19 pandemic has provided a real-time example of how to weigh
the risk of disaster-induced poverty against fraud. The CARES Act of
2020 expanded federal funding for state unemployment benefit programs
in response to the unfolding pandemic.113 Instead of beginning with a
lengthy, federal verification process to serve as a prophylactic against
fraud, the CARES Act included language creating civil and criminal penalties for individuals found to have fraudulently obtained benefits through
the program.114 The steady stream of ongoing Department of Justice
actions to successfully prosecute unemployment fraud and recover lost
109
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taxpayer dollars suggests that the federal government is capable of guarding against fraud while delivering aid to those who need it most.115
While efforts to verify eligibility for aid under Section 408 should
certainly not be abandoned, creating a presumption of eligibility that could
be retroactively verified would also serve the dual purpose of reducing
the denial of disaster relief assistance on the basis of arbitrary assumptions of fraud by reducing FEMA’s discretion to reject applicants. This
could all be done while maintaining standards of proof for eligibility:
applicants could be given housing assistance benefits up front while
having a period of time to provide documentation to FEMA once they
have had a legitimate chance to replace lost records.116
To reiterate, FEMA can and should have the flexibility to prevent
waste and abuse of taxpayer dollars. The principle justifying a presumption of eligibility is that discretion should not come at the deprivation of a
disaster victim’s human rights. FEMA has a dedicated Fraud and Internal
Investigations Division which has been providing an array of auditing
and fraud prevention training within the Agency since the mid-2000s.117
With the ability to marshal the resources of the federal government of the
United States to prevent fraud, a presumption of eligibility for housing
assistance applicants is a challenge that FEMA would be more than able
to meet.
CONCLUSION
To understand what sort of impact this proposed amendment
might make in the disaster recovery process, it is illustrative to examine
115
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FEMA’s long history of inadequate responses to natural disasters. In
Lockett v. FEMA and Armstead v. Nagin, lawsuits filed by disaster victims
against FEMA in the wakes of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, respectively, plaintiffs alleged statutory and constitutional violations of their right
to housing assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act.118 In Lockett,
the Southern District of Florida ruled that the Stafford Act’s nonliability
clause precluding judicial review of discretionary acts did not bar judicial
review of FEMA’s failed housing assistance response on the grounds that
it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.119 In Armstead,
the Eastern District of Louisiana reached the opposite holding in finding
that the same acts fell within FEMA’s discretion, and were barred by the
Stafford Act’s nonliability clause.120
The amendment proposed by this Note would have provided for
uniform outcomes in these two cases by rendering the issue of agency
discretion moot to begin with. While it is not insignificant that in at least
one case, plaintiffs were able to obtain judicial review on constitutional
grounds, it is more significant that unequal outcomes result from this
argument for standing. Natural disasters are inherently geographically
widespread, meaning that citizen litigation against FEMA for failed disaster relief responses will likely result in a circuit split that produces
uneven jurisprudence regarding the reviewability of FEMA’s disaster
response. Hurricane Katrina itself left thousands homeless in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama.121 This dynamic will further be complicated
as climate change intensifies and brings more intense natural disasters122
to regions that do not frequently suffer from them.123
The significance of this uniform availability of judicial review
should not be underestimated. Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent
case study to demonstrate that “[g]enerally, ‘disasters affect low-income
118
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victims more negatively than middle- or upper-class victims . . . .’”124
More than 90,000 individuals living in the areas affected by Hurricane
Katrina made less than $10,000 a year.125 Roughly one-third of individuals
living in the areas most impacted by Katrina were Black.126 The statistics
in New Orleans were even more disheartening: twenty-eight percent of
New Orleans’ residents lived in poverty before Hurricane Katrina,127 and
forty percent of households led by single mothers lived in poverty.128 These
residents were more likely than their wealthy counterparts to need judicial remedy to access Section 408 benefits, yet, their wealthy counterparts were far more likely to have the resources necessary to litigate their
cases.129 FEMA’s National Advisory Council acknowledged this reality in
their November 2020 Report to the Administrator, writing, “[t]he Individual Assistance Program is more accessible to those with time, income,
and access.”130
Citizen suits are rightly credited for their impact in democratizing
the enforcement of environmental laws.131 Citizen suits can similarly
serve to democratize equitable disaster relief response. The amendments
proposed by this Note not only minimize the risk of prolonged delays in
disaster relief response—which have been seen year in and year out132—
but would provide a judicial remedy by which “people most in need of assistance” could hold FEMA accountable for “compound[ing their] hardship,
confusion, and trauma.”133
While this Note raised the issue of practical limitations upon
amending the Stafford Act to enable citizen suits against FEMA for failure
to deliver Section 408 benefits, these issues are not as easily resolved without political action. Courts cannot review “political pressure, scientific
uncertainty[,] and bureaucratic inertia.”134 They certainly cannot review
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a strengthening135 Congressional proclivity towards austerity politics.136
Citizen suits will not fix racially discriminatory real estate market values
that prioritize white neighborhoods over nonwhite neighborhoods.137
Yet, there is strong normative obligation to enact the proposed
amendments to ensure that the most vulnerable disaster victims have
equal access to equitable disaster relief through judicial review. This Note
does not assert that this is a sufficient step to ensure that all disaster
victims are given the support they need to rebuild after losing everything. This Note does assert that the proposal herein has created change
in the context of environmental regulation, and that change is badly
needed in the context of disaster relief.
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